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courses converged near the entrance to 
St. Tropez Bay at a mark designated as 
"A." As it approached mark "A," the 
Charles Jourdan was sailing to lee­
ward and believed it had the right of 
way pursuant to International Yacht 
Racing Rule (IYRR) 37. 1 :  "[A] wind­
ward yacht shall keep clear of a lee­
ward yacht." The crew of the Endeav­
our failed to make an attempt to change 
course to windward until the last 
minute and as a result the boom of the 
Endeavour struck the backstay of the 
smaller Charles Jourdan, causing sub­
stantial damage. 
An International Jury was convened, 
as per the IYRR, to determine fault for 
the collision. The International Jury, 
applying the rules agreed to by the par­
ticipants in the race, found the Endeav­
our at fault. 
In September 1 993, the owner of the 
Charles Jourdan filed an action in ad­
miralty, seeking compensation for the 
damage sustained, and had the Endeav­
our arrested. The Endeavour's owners 
denied liability and counterclaimed for 
losses due to alleged false arrest of the 
vessel. The district court held that Ar­
ticles 1 2  and 1 3  of the Convention on 
International Regulation of Collisions 
at Sea (COLREGS), 33 U.S.C. § 1 600 
et seq., 33 C.F.R. § 80.01  et seq., pre­
empted application of the rules of a pri­
vate yacht racing organization. 
The district court ignored the findings 
of the International Jury and con­
cluded, under COLREGS Rule 1 3, 33 
U.S.C. foil. § 1 602, that the Charles 
Jourdan was an overtaking vessel re­
quired to keep clear of the Endeavour. 
Pursuant to the "Pennsylvania Rule," 
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. ( 1 9  Wall.) 
1 25, 22 L.Ed. 1 48 ( 1 873), failure to 
abide by navigation rules creates a pre­
sumption of negligence. Accordingly, 
the Charles Jourdan was presumed to 
be at fault. The Endeavour's failure to 
take action to avoid the collision was 
found to be significant and was appor­
tioned 40% of fault. The court deter­
mined that the physical damage to the 
Charles Jourdan was valued at 
$ 10,000, which was reduced to $4,000. 
The first circuit, although noting that 
the COLREGS were historically meant 
to be the "international rules of the 
road for maritime traffic," 58 F.3d at 
4, also stated: "[N]othing in their his-
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tory, or in the public policy issues that led 
to their enactment, indicates that they 
were meant to regulate voluntary private 
sports activity in which the participants 
have waived their application and in 
which no interference with nonparticipat­
ing maritime traffic is implicated." !d. 
The court based its conclusion not only on 
the nature of the COLREGS and the pri­
vate activity involved, but also on the 
'·strong public policy in favor of the pri­
vate settlement of disputes." 58 F.3d at 5. 
The court traced through a number of ven­
erable English decisions the premise that 
"when one voluntarily enters a yacht race 
for which published sailing instructions 
set out the conditions of participation, a 
private contract results between the partic­
ipants." !d. Such a contract established 
the conditions under which the partici­
pants agreed to be bound. "The parties 
agreed to the substantive rules for deter­
mining fault, they agreed to the adjudicat­
ing forum, and they were apprised of the 
procedures. They appeared before [the In­
ternational Jury], submitted to its jurisdic­
tion, presented evidence and argument, 
and thereafter were served with that 
body's findings and final decision." 58 
F.3d at 6. 
The appeals court also took note of fed­
eral policy favoring arbitration under § 2 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
specifically defines "collisions" as arbitra­
ble "maritime transactions." The two 
yachts had agreed to be contractually 
bound by the rules of the road as set forth 
in the IYRR. The court, finding that the 
IYRR procedures adequately addressed 
due process concerns, reversed the district 
court, commenting "It is hard to find fault 
with such a process, particularly when it is 
exactly what the participants agreed to." 
58 F.3d at 7. 
The first circuit, however, agreed with 
the district court that it had valid jurisdic­
tion over the damages issue, stating that 
courts were the rightful forum for the liti­
gation of damages, unless yacht racing au­
thorities .provided for private means of 
resolution. The court of appeals affirmed 
the district court's finding that there were 
$ 10,000 in damages resultant from the 
collision. However, the first circuit held 
that it was error for the lower court to have 
mitigated the damages by assessing the 
Charles Jourdan for comparative fault, 
since the International Jury had preemp­
tively found the Endeavour responsible 
for the 
collision, 
thereupon 
reinstating 
the full 
$ 1 0,000 
award to the 
Charles 
Jourdan. 
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Maritime Cargo 
SUBSTITUTE VESSEL IS NOT A 
COG SA UNREASONABL E 
DEVIATION UNDER TERM S OF 
BILL OF L ADING 
A carri er's restowage of cargo onto a 
vessel di fferent from that ori gi nally 
named i n  a contract of carri age i s  not 
an "unreasonable devi ati on" from the 
contract i f  a provi si on allows for ves­
sel substi tuti on "to perform all or 
part of the carri age. " 
(Yang Machine Tool Co. v. Sea-Land 
Service, Inc., CA9, 58 F.3d 1350, 
6130195) 
The Yang Machine Tool Company 
(Yang Machine) contracted with Sea­
Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) to trans­
port a large horizontal machining center 
from China to California. Since the 
cargo was too large to fit inside a stan­
dard 40-foot enclosed container, it was 
secured by steel bands in two parts on 
open "flat racks," metal pallets without 
side walls or tops, and placed on board 
the Merchant Prince. The Merchant 
Prince carried the cargo from China to 
Yokohama, Japan, where it was off­
loaded onto the Sea/and Patriot for 
completion of the carriage to California. 
During loading onto the Sea/and Pa­
triot, a hoisting cable broke, resulting in 
damage to the cargo. 
The bill of lading identified the Mer­
chant Prince as the carrying vessel. 
Nothing in the bill indicated that the 
cargo would be restowed aboard the 
Sea/and Patriot. The bill contained a 
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provision reserving the right of Sea-Land 
to use another vessel "to perform all or 
part of the carriage without giving notice 
to the shipper. It also contained a provi­
sion limiting liability to $500.00 per con­
tainer for damage occurring during car­
riage unless the shipper declared a higher 
value on the face of the bill. Yang Ma­
chine had not declared a higher value. 
Yang Machine brought suit against Sea­
Land in district court, bringing a summary 
judgment motion for damages in the 
amount of $241,700. Sea-Land cross-mo­
tioned for summary judgment, to limit its 
liability to $1,000.00 based on the con­
tract and 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 304(5). 
The lower court granted Yang Machine's 
motion, finding Sea-Land had unreason­
ably deviated by its restowage of cargo 
aboard the Sea/and Patriot. On appeal, 
the ninth circuit reversed, holding that 
Sea-Land had not unreasonably deviated 
from the contract and Yang Machine had 
failed to exercise its option to declare 
value beyond the $500 limitation. The ap­
peals court remanded, limiting Sea-Land's 
liability. 
The question before the appeals court 
was whether Sea-Land's transfer of Yang 
Machine's cargo from the Merchant 
Prince to the Sea/and Patriot constituted 
an unreasonable deviation, ousting Sea­
Land from the $500 package limitation of 
46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5). 
Under COGSA, carrier liability for dam­
age to cargo is limited to $500 per pack­
age. This limitation does not exist if either 
an unreasonable deviation from the terms 
of the bill of lading occurs, or if the ship­
per has not been afforded the opportunity 
to declare a value exceeding the $500 
package limit. 
The ninth circuit first discussed the dis­
trict court's assertion that Sea-Land unrea­
sonably deviated because the bill of lading 
did not contain a transshipment clause, 
which allows a carrier to transfer cargo 
from one vessel to another during car­
riage. The district court opined that the 
transfer from one ship to another violated 
the contract. The ninth circuit found that 
Clause 3 in the bill of lading gave Sea­
Land the right to use another vessel to 
complete all or part of the voyage and pro­
vided sufficient notice to Yang Machine 
of that possibility. Clause 3 in Sea-Land's 
bill, although not containing the word 
"transshipment," contained language 
found in bills of lading of other major car-
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riers which the district court agreed 
contained sufficient notice of potential 
transshipment. Using a substitute ves­
sel for completion of the voyage was. 
the appeals court held, a transshipment 
and not a deviation from the contract of 
carriage. 
Yang Machine contended that Clause 
3 in Sea-Land's bill of lading was a 
"liberty clause.'' A liberty clause is a 
clause which may be unenforceable if it 
gives a carrier unreasonable freedom to 
alter aspects of carriage. In evaluating 
the content of Clause 3, the ninth circu� 
determined that the clause contained 
two separate and distinct paragraphs. 
Although the first paragraph contained 
language found in a typical liberty 
clause, the second, containing language 
permitting Sea-Land to use a substitute 
vessel for all or part of the carriage, was 
enforc'eable, since it did not contain 
typical liberty clause language. 
The limitation under COGSA would 
not have been available, the court also 
stated, if the shipper had not been given 
"fair opportunity" to declare a value 
higher than $500. The court was un­
convinced by Yang Machine's claim 
that the limitation ofliability provisions 
noted on the bill prevented it from 
declaring actual value, since the shipper 
had never inquired into making a decla­
ration of higher value. Yang Machine's 
contention regarding lack of opportu­
nity was further weakened by the fact 
that the company had previously 
shipped via Sea-Land on many occa­
sions and never contested the limitation 
clause in the bill nor attempted to de­
clare higher value. The shipper's fail­
ure to claim higher value was probably 
prompted, the court observed, by an 
economic decision, since it would have 
had to pay higher fees to insure the 
cargo beyond the express limitation. 
This rationale was supported by the fact 
that Yang Machine separately insured 
the cargo, receiving payment from its 
insurer after the cargo was damaged. 
Harry C. Demiris, Jr. 
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Seaman's Damages 
N O  P UNITIVE DAM AG ES FOR 
FAIL URE TO P AY 
M AIN TEN AN CE & CURE TO 
JON ES ACT SEAM AN 
Ni nth ci rcui t award s reasonable at­
torney's fees- but not p uni ti ve d am­
ages- on clai m for wi llful and p ersi s­
tent fai lure of emp loyer to ei ther i n­
vesti gate mai ntenance and cure clai m 
or to p ay mai ntenance. 
(Glynn v. Roy AI Boat Management 
Corp. , CA9, 57 F.3d 1495, 6121195) 
Christopher Glynn (Glynn) was hired 
as a crew member in late January 1 992 
by Daniel 1. Shawhan (Shawhan), cap­
tain and master of the FN No Problem, 
a boat owned by Roy AI Boat Manage­
ment Corporation (Roy AI). Glynn 
signed a written agreement which stated 
terms of his employment, such as the 
compensation arrangement, grounds for 
termination, etc. While the No Problem 
was docked in Honolulu, Hawaii, Glynn 
was fired for coming late to work. 
Glynn brought suit under the Jones Act 
and general maritime law, alleging he 
had sustained injuries while he was a 
crew member of the No Problem. The 
jury returned verdicts favoring Glynn 
on his claims for unseaworthiness, neg­
ligence and maintenance against both 
Roy AI and Shawhan, finding both to be 
Jones Act employers. (The court had 
left the issue of whether or not Shawhan 
was an employer to the jury.) The jury 
also awarded punitive damages after de­
termining defendants had acted 
"arbitrarily, willfully, and with bad 
faith" in neglecting to provide mainte­
nance and cure. The district judge 
granted judgment n.o.v. in favor of de­
fendants on the issue of punitive dam­
ages on the basis that such damages 
were unavailable as a matter of law, but 
awarded attorney's fees on the claim for 
maintenance and cure. The court denied 
Glynn prejudgment interest since he had 
failed to request that the jury consider 
the question. Plaintiff and defendants 
appealed to the ninth circuit. 
The main issues in the case involved 
determination of who was Glynn's true 
Jones Act employer; whether attorney's 
XVIIR AC5 
